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Free the Grapes: The Commerce Clause versus the
Twenty-first Amendment with Regard to Interstate
Shipment of Wine in America
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty states currently forbid direct shipment of wine to con-
sumers from out of state wineries.' The Circuit Courts are split on
the issue of whether laws forbidding direct shipment of wine to
consumers are constitutional. In light of two recent cases, one in
the Sixth Circuit finding this type of regulation unconstitutional
and one in the Second Circuit upholding this type of regulation as
constitutional, the United States Supreme Court chose to rule on
this issue.2
The restriction or prohibition of wine sales in a state results in a
clash between the dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids pro-
tectionist activity on the part of state governments that benefits
in-state industries, and the Twenty-first Amendment, which
grants the power to the states to regulate alcohol.3 This is also a
clash between special interests; wineries that want to ship freely
to any part of the country versus wine wholesalers that want to
forbid all out of state sales.4 Proponents of regulations on the di-
rect nationwide shipment of wine argue that the prohibition of
such direct wine shipments will help states to prevent the sale of
alcohol to minors and to collect taxes.' Opponents suggest that
striking down these regulations on direct nationwide wine ship-
1. Wine America, The National Association of American Wineries, available at
http://www.americanwineries.org/wineshipment/ShippingStates.htm (last visited Novem-
ber 28, 2004).
2. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Granholm v. Heald, 124 S. Ct. 2389
(2004).
3. Jason Ukman, Interstate Wine Sales To Get Court Review, THE WASHINGTON
POST, May 25, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A52933-2004May24.html. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states
that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
4. Ukman, supra note 3 at B1.
5. Id.
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ment will be good for both consumers and for wineries.' The
United States Supreme Court's Twenty-first Amendment juris-
prudence suggests the wineries, and therefore consumers, might
win this fight.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF WINE REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
In order to buy a bottle of wine directly from an out of state
winery, a resident of Pennsylvania must order it through one of
the state operated liquor stores.7 The consumer must buy at least
6. Id.
7. John Grogan, Driven to Break State Liquor Law, THE PIILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/local/671795.htm?lc (last visited
November 28, 2004). The Pennsylvania liquor laws are codified at:
Shipment of wine into Commonwealth:
(a) The shipment of wine from out-of-State to residents of this Commonwealth is pro-
hibited, except as otherwise provided for in this section.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act or law to the contrary, a person li-
censed by another state as a producer, supplier, importer, wholesaler, distributor or
retailer of wine and who obtains a direct wine shipper license as provided for in this
section may ship up to nine liters per month of any wine not included on the list pro-
vided for in subsection (c) on the Internet order of any resident of this Common-
wealth who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age for such resident's personal use
and not for resale.
(c) Each month, the board shall publish on the Internet a list of all classes, varieties
and brands of wine available for sale in the Pennsylvania Liquor Stores. A person
holding a direct shipper license may ship only those classes, varieties and brands of
wine not included on the list at the time an Internet order is placed.
(d) An out-of-State wine shipper shall:
(1) Not ship more than nine liters per month on the Internet order of any person in
this Commonwealth.
(2) Report to the board each year the total of wine shipped into this Commonwealth
in the preceding calendar year.
(3) Permit the board or the Secretary of Revenue, or their designated representatives,
to perform an audit of the out-of-State wine shipper's records upon request.
(4) Be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the board, any other State
agency and the courts of this Commonwealth for purposes of enforcement of this sec-
tion and any related laws, rules or regulations.
(e) A direct shipper may ship wine on the Internet order of a resident into this Com-
monwealth provided that the wine is shipped to a Pennsylvania Liquor Store selected
by the resident. The wine will be subject to taxes in the same manner as wine sold di-
rectly by the board. The wine will not be released by the State store until all moneys
due, including all taxes and fees, have been paid by the resident.
(f) A person shall sign an affidavit provided by the Pennsylvania Liquor Store where
the wine was delivered to stating that the wine will only be used for the person's per-
sonal use. Any person who resells wine obtained under this section commits a mis-
demeanor of the second degree.
(g) The board may promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to imple-
ment and enforce the provisions of this section. The board may charge the resident a
fee to cover the cost associated with processing the Internet order.
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six bottles of the wine, pay a deposit, pay for shipping, and wait at
least two to three weeks for delivery.8 The consumer must then
return to the store to pick up the wine, as state law forbids deliv-
ery directly to the consumer.9 Since the wine selection at Penn-
sylvania's state run liquor stores is relatively sparse compared to
that of neighboring states such as West Virginia, New Jersey and
Delaware, what is to stop this hypothetical consumer from cross-
ing over the border to a neighboring state and visiting a private
liquor store that has no case quantity limitations and offers both
lower prices and immediate delivery? The fact that it is a crime to
transport alcohol to Pennsylvania from other states might make
the hypothetical consumer think twice before committing "an act
most Americans consider as seditious as filling up their gas
tanks." °
In the world of oenophiles, Pennsylvania is known as a con-
sumer permit state, which allows shipment of alcoholic beverages
via a three-tiered distribution system." Nationwide, there are six
different levels of regulation. 2 Thirteen states are considered re-
(h) The board shall submit monthly reports to the Appropriations Committee and the
Law and Justice Committee of the Senate and to the Appropriations Committee and
the Liquor Control Committee of the House of Representatives summarizing the
number of direct shipper licenses issued by the board, the quantity of wine sold pur-
suant to this section and the total dollar value of sales under this section.
(i) The term "wine" as used in this section shall mean liquor which is fermented from
grapes and other fruits, having alcoholic content of twenty-four per centum or less.
The term "wine" shall not include malt or brewed beverages nor shall wine include
any products containing alcohol derived from malt, grain, cereal, molasses or cactus.
47 Pa.C.S. § 4-488.
Unlawful acts relative to liquor, alcohol and liquor licensees
It shall be unlawful...
(2) For any person, except a manufacturer or the board or the holder of a sacramental
wine license or of an importer's license, to possess or transport any liquor or alcohol
within this Commonwealth which was not lawfully acquired prior to January first,
one thousand nine hundred and thirty-four, or has not been purchased from a Penn-
sylvania Liquor Store or a licensed limited winery in Pennsylvania, except in accor-
dance with section 488 or the board's regulations. In addition, it shall be lawful for
anyone to possess miniatures totaling less than one gallon purchased in another state
or a foreign country. The burden shall be upon the person possessing or transporting
such liquor or alcohol to prove that it was so acquired. But nothing herein contained
shall prohibit the manufacture or possession of wine by any person in his home for
consumption of himself, his family and guests and not for sale, not exceeding, during
any one calendar year, two hundred gallons, any other law to the contrary notwith-
standing. Such wine shall not be manufactured, possessed, offered for sale or sold on
any licensed premises.... 47 Pa. C.S. § 4-491.
8. Grogan, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Wine America, The National Association of American Wineries, supra note 1.
12. Id.
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ciprocity states and shipment between these states is relatively
unregulated. 3 Three states and the District of Columbia are lim-
ited open shipment states, in which there is minimal regulation. 4
Ten states require an out-of-state winery to obtain a permit before
shipping to their residents. 5 Five states, including Pennsylvania,
are consumer permit states. 6 Fourteen states prohibit any ship-
ments. 7 Six states not only prohibit shipment, but also make
shipment a felony. 8
The majority of the states that regulate out of state shipments
use a system similar to that used in Pennsylvania. In states that
use three-tier systems, "out-of-state producers can sell only to
wholesalers, who [can] sell only to retailers, who [then] sell to con-
sumers."9 Wholesalers typically charge out-of-state wineries up to
twenty-five percent for their service, while in state wineries faces
no such restriction.0
Even in states which allow direct shipments, the system is not
perfect. In July 2003, Virginia enacted a new law designed to
make it easier for consumers who reside in Virginia to receive di-
rect wine shipments and for Virginia wineries to ship their prod-
ucts to out of state consumers. 2' Before the new law took effect,
only Virginia wineries and retailers were permitted to ship wine
to customers within Virginia.22 With the passage of the new law,
Virginia is now considered a shipper permit state. However,
even with passage of this law, things are not perfect in Virginia,
especially for Virginia wineries.24
The problems lie with the thirteen so-called reciprocity states.25
Reciprocity is an understanding that "if your state's wineries can




16. Wine America, The National Association of American Wineries, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Deborah Simpson, Wineries Should Enjoy the Fruits of Freedom, Liberty &Law,
Volume 9 Number 2, April 2000, available at http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/2000/
9_2_00_g.asp (last visited November 28, 2004).
20. Id.
21. Terri Cofer Beirne, Virginia's Wine Shipping Law: What's the Story?, Virginia Wine
Guide, Issue 12, August/September 2004, available at http://www.virginiawineguide.com/
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your state's consumers., 26  This is not exactly the case in Vir-
ginia.27 Reciprocity is conditioned on different requirements.28
One state might condition reciprocity on whether adults must sign
for wine deliveries, while another state might condition reciprocity
on minimum quantity limits for consumers, such as two cases per
month. 9 In addition to the problems in determining the definition
of reciprocity, wineries in Virginia that are now free to ship to
other states have to deal with the other levels of regulation in the
limited shipment and permit states.
These restrictive laws occasionally backfire on the politicians
that enact them. For example, in January 2003, Gray Davis, the
governor of California at the time, agreed to send his counterpart
in Florida, Governor Jeb Bush, a case of California cabernet if the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers defeated the Oakland Raiders in Super
Bowl XXXVII. 1 After the Buccaneers won, Davis was unable to
follow through on his promise because doing so would have consti-
tuted a felony in Florida.2 Davis settled the bet by giving Bush
two bottles of cabernet at a governors' meeting in Washington
D.C.
33
Within the past three years, Federal courts in most of the Cir-
cuits have confronted this issue. Lawsuits have been filed in Ari-
zona, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia and Washington.34
These lawsuits have led to Virginia's revision of its laws allowing
the direct shipment of wine to consumers and to the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits striking down as unconstitutional laws prohibiting
direct shipments in North Carolina and Texas.3' Recent decisions
in the Second Circuit (New York) and the Sixth Circuit (Michi-
gan), which are in direct conflict with each other, have caused the





31. Eric L. Martin, A Toast to the Dignity of States: What Eleventh Amendment Juris-
prudence Portends for Direct Shipment of Wine, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303 (2003).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Coalition for Free Trade, available at http://www.coalitionforfreetrade.org/ (last
visited November 28, 2004).
35. Id. at http://www.coalitionforfreetrade.orgtlitigation/index.html (last visited No-
vember 1, 2004). The cases from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits will be discussed in Section
VI of this comment.
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United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to these cases to
decide this complex issue. 6
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT UPHOLDS NEW YORK'S REGULATORY
SCHEME
In Swedenburg v. Kelly, the plaintiffs, proprietors of two out-of-
state wineries, and several New York wine consumers, filed an
action against New York State seeking a declaration that the sec-
tions of New York's beverage law that prohibited direct sales to
consumers by out-of-state wineries were facially unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause.37 The plaintiffs argued that
the New York law violated the dormant Commerce Clause because
it prevented the wineries from shipping their wine directly to the
New York consumers.38 The wineries further argued that based on
their size, with estimated sales to New York of only 120 to 180
bottles of wine a year, direct sales to consumers via website or the
mail were "their only possible access to the New York market."9
Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that New York's licensing scheme
provided an unconstitutional advantage to in-state wineries, an
advantage which was not "saved" by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.4" They also contended that the New York law impermissibly
banned out-of-state wineries from soliciting orders from New York
consumers, in violation of the First Amendment.41
36. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Granholm v. Heald, 124 S. Ct. 2389
(2004).
37. 358 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2002). The dormant Commerce Clause restricts state
and local governments from impeding the free flow of goods from one state to another.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469-70 (1992). The Supreme Court has established a
two-step approach to determine whether a state or municipal law violates the dormant
Commerce Clause. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). Under the first step, the
court must determine whether the challenged law "regulates evenhandedly with only inci-
dental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce."
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). Discrimination in
this sense means the differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits in-state industries and burdens out-of-state industries. Id. "If a restriction on
commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid." Id. Nondiscriminatory regula-
tions that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid "unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
(citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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New York State and the intervening defendants, wholesale dis-
tributors of alcohol, argued that the regulatory scheme operated
even-handedly with respect to in-state and out-of-state interests,
and did not discriminate against the out-of-state wineries.42 The
defendants further argued that, even if the regulatory scheme did
discriminate against out-of-state wineries, it was excepted from
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause because it was a
"proper exercise of New York's authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment to regulate the importation and distribution of alco-
hol for delivery or use within its borders."'3
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion, striking down the
regulatory scheme as unconstitutional because it "directly dis-
criminated against interstate commerce."" The district court held
that the ban on direct shipment of out-of-state wine did not "im-
plicate the State's core concerns under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.' 5 The defendants appealed to the Second Circuit."
The Second Circuit began its opinion by noting that four other
Circuits recently decided similar cases and struck down state laws
prohibiting out-of-state shipments as unconstitutional violations
of the dormant Commerce Clause. 7 The court then began its
analysis by setting forth the traditional dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence: a state regulation is unconstitutional if it
"affects interstate commerce in a manner that either (i) discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, or (ii) imposes burdens on in-
terstate commerce that are incommensurate with putative local
42. Id.
43. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229.
44. Id. (citing Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
45. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The core concerns
of section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment have been described as temperance, the promo-
tion of orderly market conditions, and revenue production. Wine-by-Mail Ban Struck Down
Under Dormant Commerce Clause, Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society,
Issue 1, No. 1, available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/packets/vol_l_no_Ji001504.shtml
(last visited November 28, 2004). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held
that "State laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are not entitled to the same
deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor."
Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (citing Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
276 (1984)).
46. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229.
47. Id. at 230-31. The district cited the following cases: Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517,
524 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 400 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Eas-
ley, 325 F.3d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 2003); and Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1108 (11th
Cir. 2002). Id. at 231.
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gains."" A finding that the regulatory scheme violates the dor-
mant Commerce Clause does not doom the scheme as unconstitu-
tional, for it can be "saved" by the Twenty-first Amendment in the
second step, but only if it advances one of the Amendment's "core
concerns.' 5 The court then noted that, "under this two-tier analy-
sis, none of the state statutes regulating the importation of alcohol
were saved by the Twenty-first Amendment core concern exami-
nation." ° The court then held that "this two-step approach is
flawed because it has the effect of unnecessarily limiting the au-
thority delegated to the states through the clear and unambiguous
language of section 2 [of the Twenty-first Amendment]".5'
The court adopted a second mode of analysis, a mode adopted in
only one other Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in a case in which it
upheld Indiana's statute "restricting the direct shipment of wine
on the grounds that it was a permissible expression of the state's
authority under section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment."52 This
mode of analysis "considers the scope of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment's grant of authority to the states to determine whether the
challenged statute is within the ambit of that authority, such that
it is exempted from the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause." 3
In the court's view, the inquiry "should not allow the protective
doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause to subordinate the
plain language of the Twenty-first Amendment. Instead, the in-
quiry should be sensitive to the manner in which these two consti-
tutional forces interact .... ""
The court then lapsed into a detailed history of Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence, initially focusing upon two federal
laws enacted before Prohibition: the Wilson Act, passed in 1890
and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, whose intent was to allow
states to control and regulate alcohol within their borders.55 Since
48. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki,
320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003)).
49. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000)).
53. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 232. The Wilson Act, Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890), gave states the authority
to regulate imported liquor "to the same extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory," while the Webb-Kenyon
Act, Ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913), "prohibited the shipment or transportation, in any manner
or by any means whatsoever, of any ... liquor of any kind, from one State ... into any other
State which ... is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold,
120 Vol. 43
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most states wished to control alcohol consumption even after the
passage of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed Prohibition, the
language of section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely mir-
rored the language of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.56 The
Second Circuit ruled that, based on the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment, section 2 of the Amendment "effectively constitu-
tionalize[d] most state prohibitions regulating importation, trans-
portation, and distribution of alcoholic beverages from the stream
of interstate commerce into the state."57  Because these prohibi-
tions were "constitutionalized," the court reasoned they were ex-
empt from dormant Commerce Clause analysis; otherwise, section
2 of the Amendment would be moot."
The court then cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a case in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that "Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
grants the States virtually complete control over whether to per-
mit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system."9 The Second Circuit construed this "consti-
tutional grant of authority" to mean that the Twenty-first
Amendment should not be "subordinated to the dormant Com-
merce Clause inquiry when the two provisions conflict."
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' arguments that a series
of Supreme Court decisions narrowed the grant of authority given
to the states under the Twenty-first Amendment6' and that the
Supreme Court's decisions have confined the scope of section 2 of
the Amendment to state regulations that advance core concerns.6 2
The court held that the only thing the Supreme Court has done is
to confine the scope of section 2 to its plain language; language
that permits New York's regulatory scheme." Thus, according to
or in any manner used." These were pre-Prohibition statutes passed by Congress in an
attempt to assist states wishing to prohibit alcohol sales. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 232.
States were having trouble doing this because of the Supreme Court's rulings at the time,
which would eventually come to be known as dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Id.
Prohibition of course was the Eighteenth Amendment, which forbade consumption of alco-
hol across the United States from 1919 to 1933. Id.
56. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 232.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 232-33.
59. Id. at 233 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).






the Second Circuit, New York may regulate freely within its bor-
ders; it only runs afoul of the Commerce Clause if it attempts to
regulate beyond its borders.' The court said this about New
York's regulatory scheme,
[it] falls squarely within the ambit of section 2's grant of au-
thority. The statutory scheme regulates only the importation
and distribution of alcohol in New York. New York's prohibi-
tion of the sale and shipment of wine by unlicensed wineries
directly to New York consumers serves valid regulatory inter-
ests. The statute allows the state to monitor the distribu-
tion and sale of alcoholic beverages by permitting such distri-
bution and sale only through state-licensed entities super-
vised by, and accountable to, the SLA.65
Furthermore, the court held this was not a state law that consti-
tuted mere economic protectionism because there was no evidence
that the regulatory scheme was enacted to favor local wineries
over out-of-state wineries." In fact, the court noted, out-of-state
wineries are permitted to obtain a license in New York so long as
a physical presence is established within the state.67 While the
court recognized that "state statutes requiring business operations
to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be
performed elsewhere.., have been declared to be virtually per se
illegal," it also recognized that alcohol was a unique area of com-
merce and the regulatory concerns addressed in the statute were
valid concerns."
The court then quickly dismissed the challenge to the statute
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that because
"the statutory scheme operates without regard to residency and
does not provide New York residents with advantages unavailable
to nonresidents," it does not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.69
While the Second Circuit adopted the view that the relevant in-
quiry should not allow the doctrine of the dormant Commerce
64. Id. At this point, the opinion gets into a detailed examination of the history of
Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. This will be discussed in Section VI of this Com-
ment.
65. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 237.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 238.
69. Id. at 239-40.
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Clause to subordinate the plain language of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Sixth Circuit adopted the traditional dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine when it struck down Michigan's regu-
latory system as unconstitutional.7 °
IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STRIKES MICHIGAN'S LAW AS VIOLATIVE
OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In Heald v. Engler, the plaintiffs, wine connoisseurs, wine jour-
nalists, and an out-of-state winery, filed an action under the fed-
eral civil rights statute, claiming that Michigan's three-tier alco-
hol distribution system discriminated against out-of-state wine
sellers in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.7' Michigan's
system did not permit out-of-state wine sellers to ship directly to
Michigan consumers, but in-state sellers were allowed to ship di-
rectly to the homes of Michigan customers2.7  The defendants, who
included state officials and the Michigan Wine & Beer Wholesal-
ers Association, argued that Michigan's regulatory scheme was
constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment. 73  The district
court granted the state's motion for summary judgment and de-
nied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.74
The district court found that Michigan's statutory scheme was
not "mere economic protectionism," but rather was designed "to
ensure the collection of taxes from out-of-state wine manufactur-
ers and to reduce the risk of alcohol falling into the hands of mi-
nors."75 The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.6
70. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. Heald, 342 F.3d at 519-20. Civil action for deprivation of rights, states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunc-
tive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applica-
ble exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
72. Heald, 342 F.3d at 519.
73. Id. at 519-20.
74. Id. at 520.
75. Id. at 521.
76. Id. at 520.
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Among the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs were affidavits
by wineries and distributors displaying their willingness to pay
required taxes and obtain the necessary permits if allowed to ship
directly to Michigan consumers.7 The defendants countered with
documents from the Michigan Department of Treasury that esti-
mated the potential lost tax revenue to out-of-state sales, an affi-
davit from the Michigan Liquor Control Commission detailing the
number of controlled buy operations conducted by the Commission
in Michigan to identify retailers that sell alcohol to minors and an
affidavit from the Liquor Control Division of the Michigan Attor-
ney General's Office detailing controlled buy operations conducted
781over the internet.
Michigan's regulatory scheme was the same three-tier system
seen in most other states: out-of state manufacturers needed to
obtain a permit in Michigan and could ship only to wholesalers,
wholesalers could ship only to licensed retailers and the consumer
could only purchase from licensed retailers.79 The plaintiffs ar-
gued to the Sixth Circuit that this scheme gave an unfair advan-
tage to in-state wineries because they could avoid the price mark-
ups of the wholesaler and retailer, thereby making in-state wines
cheaper to the consumer and more profitable to the in-state winer-
ies."o The plaintiffs also argued the price of the license was dis-
criminatory; $300 for out-of-state wineries as opposed to $25 for
in-state wineries."' The state countered that the regulations it
imposes on in-state wineries more than make up for whatever per-
ceived advantage they possess over out-of-state wineries and that
the advantage itself is "de minimis.'
The Sixth Circuit phrased the issue as "how the 'dormant'
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment interact to
limit the ways in which a state can control alcohol sales and dis-
tribution."83 The majority initially noted that Article I, Section 8,
of the United States Constitution granted Congress the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States ..." and that the long held doctrine of the United States Su-
preme Court is that "this affirmative grant of authority to Con-





82. Heald, 342 F.3d at 521.
83. Id. at 522.
Vol. 43
Interstate Shipment of Wine
gress also encompasses an implicit or 'dormant' limitation on the
authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate
commerce." 84  The Sixth Circuit, after an examination of the Su-
preme Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence, decided to
apply the traditional Commerce Clause analysis."
Under the traditional Commerce Clause analysis, "facially dis-
criminatory laws are subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that the
state must demonstrate that no reasonable nondiscriminatory al-
ternatives are available to advance the same legitimate goals." 6
The court then held that the fact that a state has "virtually com-
plete control over the importation and sale of liquor ... has little
value in a case requiring Commerce Clause analysis."87 The court
in striking down Michigan's regulatory scheme, quoted Supreme
Court Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Healy v. Beer Insti-
tute: "[The law's] invalidity is fully established by its facial dis-
crimination against interstate commerce .... This is so despite
the fact that the law regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages,
since its discriminatory character eliminates the immunity af-
forded by the Twenty-first Amendment."8 The Sixth Circuit held
it was clear that the Michigan regulatory scheme was facially dis-
criminatory, "with the effect of benefiting the in-state wineries
and burdening those from out of state."8 Since the statute was
facially discriminatory, the question then became whether Michi-
gan's regulatory scheme was constitutional because it advanced
one of the core concerns under the Twenty-first Amendment.0
The court held Michigan was unable to prove that its regulatory
scheme was enacted to meet one of the core concerns of the
Twenty-first Amendment and that "no reasonable non-
84. Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989)). See also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
85. Heald, 342 F.3d at 524. A detailed examination of the history of Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence will be discussed in Section VI of this Comment.
86. Id. The court held that a statute that "on its face discriminates against interstate
commerce ... invokes the strictest scrutiny .... "Id., (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336-37 (1979)).
87. Heald, 342 F.3d at 524. Statutes that facially discriminate are per se invalid, and
can only be upheld if they serve an important state interest and no other way exists to
serve that interest. Id. (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
Statutes that are not facially discriminatory, however, but discriminatory in their effect
require a lower level of scrutiny. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)). In order to get past the lower level scrutiny, the effect on interstate commerce
must be minimal and the statute must serve a legitimate public purpose. Id.
88. Heald, 342 F.3d at 524 (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 344).
89. Id. at 525.
90. Id. at 525-26.
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discriminatory means [existed] to satisfy these concerns."9 The
court held that discriminating against out-of-state wineries in fa-
vor of in-state wineries did not meet the core concerns of the
Twenty-first Amendment and struck down the statute.
92
On May 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the appeals of the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit
decisions.9' The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and
asked the parties to confine their arguments to the following ques-
tion: "Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state win-
eries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability
of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce
Clause in light of sec. 2 of the 21't Amendment?"
9 4
V. SMALL WINERIES VERSUS WHOLESALERS AND STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL
On one side of this fight are small wineries like Peninsula Cel-
lars, a small, 9-year old winery in Traverse City, Michigan.9' In
2003, Peninsula Cellars' Riesling wine earned the distinction of
being named best in the world in both white wine and Riesling
competitions.96 However, because of laws restricting sales, Penin-
sula is prohibited from shipping their award-winning wine to
nearly half of the states in the country.97
Small wineries, such as Peninsula Cellars, are the types of win-
eries that make up the Coalition for Free Trade, a trade group at
the forefront of the efforts to get bans on out-of-state sales over-
turned.9" The Coalition for Free Trade has retained former inde-
pendent counsel Kenneth Starr, best known for his investigation
of President Bill Clinton several years ago.99 According to Starr,
"[the wineries] welcome the opportunity to challenge laws whose
sole purpose is economic protectionism .... This can only benefit
91. Id. at 526.
92. Id.
93. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Granholm v. Heald, 124 S. Ct. 2389
(2004).
94. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004).
95. Kim Norris, Wineries to get Hearing - Supreme Court to Test Michigan Law, THE
DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 25, 2004, available at http://www.freep.comlmoney/business
wine25e_ 20040525.htm (last visited November 28, 2004).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Coalition for Free Trade, supra note 34.
99. Coalition for Free Trade, available at http://www.coalitionforfreetrade.org/press.
html (last visited November 28, 2004).
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businesses, families and consumers .... ,' Another important
player on the side of the wineries is the Family Winemakers of
California, a trade group that represents 570 wineries in Califor-
nia.'0 ' The organization's president, Paul Kronenberg, recently
said, ".... the only way that most small wineries can survive eco-
nomically is to open up new markets [by] shipping directly to con-
sumers. New and small wineries, trying to build their brands, are
of little interest to large wholesalers who like to truck pallets of
wine, not a case or two."
0 2
A national grassroots organization of consumers and wineries
known as "Free the Grapes" is also active in this campaign to have
anti-shipping laws overturned.0 3 On its website, the group lists
several reasons why consumers are angry, among them:
Each vintage, more wines are produced than are represented
by wholesaler middlemen, or can be sold in retailer outlets.
The number of U.S. wineries increased by over 500% to 2,700
in the past 30 years. U.S. wineries produce over 10,000 new
wines each vintage, but nearly all wineries are small produc-
ers; 2,650 of America's wineries produce less than 5% of U.S.
wine production. And less than 17% of U.S. wineries are rep-
resented by distributors in all 50 states. And consumer de-
mand for these fine wines is thriving. Consumers expect to be
able to purchase the wines they want, in the manner of their
choosing: from retailers, at the winery, and remotely by tele-
phone, fax, and online.'
The main opponent of the wineries and consumers is the Wine
& Spirits Wholesalers Association of America, Inc. °5 On its web-
site is the following message, "Wholesalers work every day to pro-
vide responsible access to alcohol."06 Allied with the wholesalers
are the attorneys general of 36 states, who joined Michigan's gov-
ernor in "urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reaffirm a state's right
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Family Winemakers of California, http'/lfanilywinemakers.orgt (last
visited November 1, 2004).
102. Coalition for Free Trade, supra note 99.
103. Free the Grapes, available at http://www.freethegrapes.orgfindex.html (last visited
November 28, 2004).
104. Id. at http://www.freethegrapes.org/research.html#issue (last visited November 28,
2004).
105. Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., available at http://www.wswa.org/




to regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol as guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution and federal law.""0 7 In a petition sent to the
Supreme Court released on March 5, 2004, the attorneys general
stated "[t]he States have a significant interest in exercising their
police powers to protect the health safety and welfare of their citi-
zens in the area of alcohol shipping. ""' The petition added that
overturning the system of regulation is a "threat to the core con-
cerns protected by the Twenty-First Amendment - consumption by
minors, maintaining an orderly market, and collection of taxes."0 9
One party that has not yet weighed in on this dispute is Presi-
dent George W. Bush.' President Bush is caught between "busi-
ness interests that favor free commerce and religious conserva-
tives concerned about minors buying wine."'' . Interestingly
enough, if President Bush takes the side of religious conserva-
tives, he would pit himself against his brother-in-law, Robert
Koch."2 Koch is married to President Bush's sister Doro, and is
also the president of the Wine Institute, an industry group in fa-
vor of free trade."3 A coalition of religious and community groups
complete the lineup for the pro-shipping law side."4
The parties have made the issues in this dispute crystal clear:
on one side wineries and consumers seek, for economic reasons,
direct nationwide access to one another, mostly via the Internet.
On the other side, wine wholesalers, state governments and reli-
gious and community groups want to maintain the system of regu-
lation to avoid consumption by minors, maintain an orderly mar-
ket and ensure collection of taxes.
VI. UNDERAGE ACCESS AND TAX REVENUES
The wineries and consumers cite to a report from the Federal
Trade Commission (the "FTC") released on July 3, 2003, which
found that "e-commerce offers consumers lower prices and more




110. Dana Milbank, White House Considers Role in Wine Case; Supreme Court Dispute
Over Internet Sales Ban Splits Bush's Political Allies, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 29,
2004, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21966-
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choices in the wine market," and that direct shipping could poten-
tially save consumers as much as twenty-one percent on some
wines."' The report also found that there are less restrictive
ways of prohibiting access to minors other than banning direct
shipments to consumers altogether."6 Todd Zywicki, the Director
of the FTC's Office of Policy Planning, stated in a press release
announcing the FTC's findings, "[ojurs is a very comprehensive
analysis of the direct shipping issue. We gathered empirical evi-
dence on both the competition and consumer protection aspects:
the effects of direct shipping laws on prices and variety, and the
states' experiences with direct shipping and underage drinking.""7
The FTC held a workshop in October 2002 "to evaluate possible
anti-competitive barriers to e-commerce in wine and many other
industries.""' The report is based upon a three-pronged analysis
of the issue."' First, the FTC "heard testimony from all sides of
the wine issue, including wineries, wholesalers, state regulators,
and a Nobel laureate in economics."12 ° Next, the FTC gathered
evidence from a variety of published studies and court decisions
and from other sources, such as package delivery companies and
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.12' Finally, the
FTC studied the wine market in McLean, Virginia, an area in a
state that recently allowed direct shipments, and compared the
prices and choices that consumers could find in stores in McLean
to the prices and choices that could be found online.'22 In all, the
report made six main findings.2"
The first finding was that bans or restrictions by over half the
states on interstate direct shipping of wine represented "the single
largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine.'
24
115. Federal Trade Commission, E-commerce Lowers Prices, Increases Choices in Wine




118. Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine,
A Report from the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, July 2003,
www.ftec.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf, at 2 (last visited November 1, 2004).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. See also Jason Ukman, supra note 3.
123. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 118 at 3-4.
124. Id. at 14-16.
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The study also noted that many of those same states allowed for
direct shipment to consumers by in-state wineries.
The second finding was that consumers could usually save
money by purchasing wine online, depending on the quantity pur-
chased, and the method of delivery. 126 The study found that "if
consumers use the least expensive shipping method, they could
save an average of 8-13% on wines costing more than $20 per bot-
tle, and an average of 20-21% on wines costing more than $40 per
bottle."1
27
The third finding was that consumers in McLean, Virginia could
purchase many wines online that were not available in local liquor
stores. 12' The study found that "15 percent of a sample of wines
available online were not available from retail wine stores within
ten miles of McLean."
129
The fourth finding was that many other regulations beside out-
right bans impeded e-commerce in wine.'30 These restrictions in-
clude prohibiting online orders, limits on annual purchases, bans
on advertising from out-of-state wineries, requirements that con-
sumers purchase permits and requirements that delivery compa-
nies obtain an individual license for every vehicle used to deliver
wine."'
The fifth finding was that although citizens are concerned about
sales to minors, states that allowed direct shipments reported few
or no problems with shipments to minors.8 2 The study found that
some states required delivery companies to obtain an adult signa-
ture upon delivery, while other states had "developed penalty and
enforcement systems to provide incentives for both out-of-state
suppliers and package delivery companies to comply with the
law.""'33 This finding seems to particularly hurt the argument that
sales should be restricted or banned to keep wine out of the hands
of minors.
The final finding was that many states which allowed direct
shipping also collected taxes from those shipments by requiring
125. Id. at 15 n.62.
126. Id. at 16-22.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 118 at 23.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 26
133. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 118 at 26-31.
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the out-of-state wineries to obtain permits. Most states that al-
lowed direct shipments reported very few, if any, problems with
tax collection to the FTC.131 Many of the states that had reciproc-
ity agreements with other states did not tax direct shipments at
all.
136
The FTC concluded that consumers could reap significant bene-
fits if given the option of purchasing wine online from out-of-state
wineries and having it shipped directly to them instead of to an in-
state wholesaler and retailer.137 The FTC also concluded that the
problem of shipments to minors appeared to be non-existent and
that states could implement a system by which they can collect
taxes from direct shipments.38
While the FTC study seems like overwhelming evidence in favor
of allowing direct shipments, and will most likely be examined
very closely by the Supreme Court, the wholesalers and states also
have convincing evidence to offer.
In June 2004, the Massachusetts Attorney General, in an un-
dercover "sting" caught several out-of-state alcohol retailers ship-
ping wine and other liquor to underage college students . 13  The
"sting" also netted several leading overnight delivery companies
for not obtaining signatures on boxes clearly labeled as containing
alcoholic beverages.' 41 In July 2004, a television news investiga-
tion in Kentucky found similar results to the Massachusetts
sting. 4' The news crew was even able to videotape the delivery
driver leaving liquor unattended on a doorstep, in violation of
Kentucky law. 4 2 The news station obtained the shipping records
from the delivery company and found that someone scribbled in
134. Id at 38. The report used New Hampshire as an example of a state that collects
taxes by requiring out-of-state wineries to obtain permits. Id. This is similar to the system
used in Pennsylvania. See Pennsylvania Liquor Control statutes, supra note 7.
135. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 118 at 39
136. Id. at 39 n. 166.
137. Id. at 40-41.
138. Id. at 26-27.
139. John Fitzpatrick, Online Alcohol Vendors Nabbed for Selling to Kids, available at
http://www.wswa.org/public.media/20040609.html. See also Massachusetts Attorney Gen-
eral website, available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=986&id=1 241 (last visited
November 28, 2004).
140. Fitzpatrick, supra note 139.
141. PR Newswire, Majority of State Attorneys General and Wine & Spirits Distributors
Urge the Supreme Court to Allow States to Continue Regulating Alcohol, July 29, 2004,
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/steries.pl? ACCT=104&STORY= /ww/




the signature block on the delivery form, leaving the impression
that the required adult signature had been obtained.1
4
1
In New York, while Republican governor George Pataki is in fa-
vor of New York passing a law allowing direct shipments to con-
sumers,14 a poll of New York residents released in mid-July 2004
found that eighty-two percent opposed direct shipment of alcoholic
beverages to consumers and eighty-nine percent thought that such
shipments would bring about more alcohol abuse by minors.45 An
eighteen-year-old senior at Albany High School ordered four bot-
tles of wine from a California based online retailer with his credit
card. 146 The wine was delivered to his address in an unmarked
box. "'47 Although the website requires a customer to provide their
age, the student lied and entered the age of twenty-five on the or-
der form.4 4 The delivery driver left the box on the student's front
step and did not ask for identification.
9
It is not clear if these incidents are aberrations, noticed now
only because of the attention focused on the issue, or indications of
a more serious, endemic, problem. If the wholesalers and states
can prove to the Supreme Court that allowing direct shipments
increases the chances of minors abusing alcohol, they stand a
much better chance of the Court upholding the laws banning di-
rect shipments.
In response to the arguments made by the wholesalers, the
Family Winemakers of California, Coalition for Free Trade, The
Wine Institute and the American Vintners Association have pro-
posed that states allowing direct shipments adopt a "Model Act,"
which addresses the issues of sales to minors and taxes and allows
for an orderly market.'
143. Id.
144. Joseph Spector, Wine Sale Reforms Backed, THE ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT, June 30,
2004, at 1B, available at http://www.democratandchronicle.com/news0630374OMP7_news.
shtml (last visited November 28, 2004).
145. Kate Carberry, Poll Shows People Oppose Internet Alcohol Sales, The Legislative
Gazette, July 21, 2004, available at http://www.legislativegazette.comreadmore .php?





150. Free the Grapes, supra note 103 at http://www.freethegrapes.org/wineries.html
#model (last visited November 1, 2004). The proposed legislation states:
Add new Section --- to the Alcohol Beverage Control Act as follows: Section ----
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Since there are convincing arguments both in support of and
against the direct shipments of wine and other liquor to consum-
ers, perhaps a look at the history of the United States Supreme
Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence can cast some
1. Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, any person cur-
rently licensed in any other state as an alcoholic beverage producer, supplier, im-
porter, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who obtains an out-of-state shipper's li-
cense, as provided below, may ship up to twenty-four (24) bottles per month of any al-
coholic beverage directly to a resident of [State] who is at least 21 years of age for
such resident's personal use and not for resale.
2. Before sending any shipment to a resident of [State] the out-of-state shipper
must first:
(a) File an application with the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Depart-
ment),
(b) pay a $100.00 registration fee,
(c) provide to the Department a true copy of its current alcoholic beverage license is-
sued in another state, and
(d) obtain from the Department an out-of-state shipper's license.
3. All out-of-state shipper licensees shall:
(a) Not ship more than twenty-four (24) bottles per month to any person.
(b) Not ship to any address in an area identified by the Department as a "dry" or local
option area.
(c) Ensure that all containers of alcoholic beverages shipped directly to a resident in
this state are conspicuously labeled with the words "CONTAINS ALCOHOL:
SIGNATURE OF PERSON AGE 21 OR OLDER REQUIRED FOR DELIVERY."
(d) Report to the Department annually the total of alcoholic beverages, by type,
shipped into the state the preceding calendar year.
(e) Annually pay to the [State Revenue Agency] all sales taxes and excise taxes due
on sales to residents of [State] in the preceding calendar year, the amount of such
taxes to be calculated as if the sale were in [State] at the location where delivery is
made.
(f) Permit the Department or the [State Revenue Agency] to perform an audit of the
out-of-state shipper's records upon request.
(g) Be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the Department or any other
state agency and the [State] courts concerning enforcement of this section and any re-
lated laws, rules or regulations.
4. The out-of-state shipper may annually renew its license with the Department by
paying a $-.00 renewal fee and providing the Department a true copy of its current
alcoholic beverage license issued in another state.
5. The Department and the [State Revenue Agency] may promulgate rules and
regulations to effectuate the purposes of this law.
6. The Department may enforce the requirements of this section by administrative
proceedings to suspend or revoke an out-of-state shipper's license, and the Depart-
ment may accept payment of an offer in compromise in lieu of suspension, such pay-
ments to be determined by rule promulgated by the Department.
7. Shipments of alcoholic beverages from out-of-state direct to consumers in [State]
from persons who do not possess a current out-of-state shipper's license or other per-
mit or license from the Department are prohibited, Any person who knowingly
makes, participates in, transports, imports or receives such a shipment from out-of-
state is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by [insert fine and/or jail]. Without limi-
tation on any punishment or remedy, criminal or civil, any person who knowingly
makes, participates in, transports, imports or receives such a shipment from out-of-
state commits an unfair trade practice. Id.
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light on how the Court might rule when it takes up the issue in
the coming term.
VII. THE HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: DOES THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
TRUMP THE 21S AMENDMENT?
From the sixty-five-year history of Twenty-first Amendment ju-
risprudence, it is clear that, in early cases, the Supreme Court
made the Amendment an exception to the Commerce Clause, but,
starting in the 1960s, the Court began striking down regulations
enacted pursuant to the 2 1st amendment under the Commerce
Clause.
In Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, Ziffrin, an Indiana corporation, trans-
ported whiskey received from distillers in Kentucky to consignees
in Chicago from 1933 to 1938.51 In 1938, Kentucky passed the
Kentucky Alcohol Beverage Control Act, which forbade the carry-
ing of intoxicating liquors by carriers other than licensed common
carriers and forbade distillers to deliver to an unauthorized car-
rier.1 2  Kentucky refused to grant Ziffrin both a Common Car-
rier's Certificate and a transporter's license, denying it access to
the whiskey it had been transporting to Chicago for the previous
five years.' Ziffrin argued, in part, that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution."' The Court held that "the Twenty-first
Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate concerning
intoxicating liquors . . . unfettered by the Commerce Clause. " "'
Since Kentucky had absolute power to prohibit manufacture, sale,
transportation, or possession of intoxicants, it was permissible for
Kentucky to permit these things only under certain prescribed
conditions."' Finally, the Court held that "permitting manufac-
ture of whiskey only upon condition that it be sold to an indicated
class of customers and transported in definitely specified ways"
were not unreasonable conditions and were "clearly appropriate
for effectuating the policy of limiting traffic in order to minimize
well-known evils, and secure payment of revenue." 7
151. 308 U.S. 132, 133 (1939).
152. Ziffrin, Inc., 308 U.S. 134-37.
153. Id. at 137.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 138.
156. Id.
157. Ziffrin, Inc., 308 U.S. at 139.
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In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Commission, in retalia-
tion for Indiana imposing a fee to import beer into the state,
Michigan enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of beer produced
in any state that discriminated against Michigan-produced beer.'
Indianapolis Brewing argued that such retaliation violated the
Commerce Clause and that the Twenty-first Amendment should
not be interpreted to allow one state to punish another for doing
what the Amendment permits, imposing a fee on imports. 159 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that". . . the right
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the Commerce Clause."6 °
The sweeping proposition that the Commerce Clause did not
limit state regulation of alcohol stood for a quarter of a century.
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Court began to chip away at
this proposition. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
involved alcohol that was sold tax-free at a New York airport to
travelers departing on international flights."' Although these
sales were governed under a federal law and administered by a
federal agency, they were illegal under New York law at the
time. '6 New York argued that the Twenty-first Amendment re-
pealed the Commerce Clause.' The Court rejected this argument,
holding that "[i]f the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto re-
pealed, then Congress would be left with no regulatory power over
interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor. Such a con-
clusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incor-
rect."'64 The Court concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment
must be interpreted in light of the Commerce Clause.'65
In Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, the Court
appeared to backtrack some from its decision in Hostetter.6 ' In
that case, the South Carolina Tax Commission assessed Heublein,
Inc., a Connecticut corporation that produced alcoholic beverages,
over $21,000 in taxes on income derived from the sale of its bever-
158. 305 U.S. 391, 392-93 (1939). Michigan made a list of such states, which included
Indiana. Id. at 393.
159. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 392-94.
160. Id. at 394.
161. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
162. Hostetter, 377 U.S. 326.
163. Id. at 331-32.
164. Id. at 332.
165. Id.
166. 409 U.S. 275 (1972).
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ages in South Carolina.167 Heublein paid the taxes and filed suit to
recover them.' The state trial court held that a federal statute
protected Heublein from tax liability in South Carolina.6 9 The Su-
preme Court of South Carolina reversed and Heublein appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.7"
At the time, only registered producers of registered brands of al-
coholic beverages could ship alcoholic beverages into South Caro-
lina."' Heublein had one employee in South Carolina.172 The em-
ployee's office was in his home, but he kept a desk at the ware-
house of the local distributor of Hueblein's products. 3 This ar-
rangement existed only to satisfy the Beverage Control Act be-
cause the distributor, rather than the employee, sold most of
Heublein's products. 7 4 Heublein argued that this regulatory
scheme violated the federal statute and the Commerce Clause, but
the Court disagreed."' The Court held that ".. . by virtue of [the
Twenty-first Amendment's] provisions a State is totally uncon-
fined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts
the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or
consumption within its borders."'76 The Court upheld South Caro-
167. Heublein, Inc., 409 U.S. at 276.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a) - State Taxation of Income from Interstate Com-
merce (1959)). The relevant portion of the statute provides:
(a) Minimum standards. No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power
to impose, for any taxable year ending after the date of the enactment of this Act [en-
acted Sept. 14, 19591, a net income tax on the income derived within such State by
any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State
by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the fol-
lowing:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for
sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for ap-
proval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point
outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from
such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1)
170. Heublein, Inc., 409 U.S. at 276.
171. Id. at 277 (citing S.C. CODE ANN § § 4-134, 4-135 (1962 and Supp. 1971)).
172. Heublein, Inc., 409 U.S. at 277.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 283.
176. Id. at 283 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
330 (1964)).
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lina's taxation scheme under both the federal statute and the
Commerce Clause.
177
In Craig v. Boren, the Court seemingly changed course again,
back toward its holding in Hostetter.v7 Appellants, Craig, a male
under twenty-one years of age and Whitener, a liquor vendor, filed
an action in district court that sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the enforcement of two sections of an Oklahoma
statute that prohibited the sale of non-intoxicating three and two-
tenths percent beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to
females under the age of eighteen.179 Appellants argued that the
statutes discriminated against males between eighteen and
twenty years of age. s" The Western District Court of Oklahoma
upheld the constitutionality of the statutes and dismissed the ac-
tion.' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the gender-
based differential invidiously discriminated and denied equal pro-
tection of the laws to males eighteen to twenty years of 
age.8 2
Oklahoma argued that its regulatory scheme was lawful under
section two of the Twenty-first Amendment, which allows for state
regulation of alcoholic beverages within its borders." The Court
held the Twenty-first Amendment did not save the statutes from
violating the Equal Protection Clause.' The Majority noted that
in early cases in the mid-1800s, it "recognized a broad authority in
state governments to regulate the trade of alcoholic beverages
within their borders free from implied restrictions under the
Commerce Clause."'85 Near the end of the 1800s, the Court under-
cut this broad authority in Leisy v. Hardin, which led Congress to
pass the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. 88 The passage of the
177. Heublein, Inc., 409 U.S. at 283.
178. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
179. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. Oklahoma prohibited the sale of non-intoxicating three
and two-tenths percent beer to minors. Id. at 192 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 241) Okla-
homa defined a minor as a female under eighteen years of age and a male under twenty-
one years of age. Id. at 192 (citing OKIA. STAT. tit. 37, § 245 (repealed 1983)).
180. Id. at 192.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 204.
183. Id.
184. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204-05. The Equal Protection Clause, states, in part, "no state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. Craig, 429 U.S. at 205.
186. Id. (citing Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890)). See also the Wilson and Webb-
Kenyon Acts, supra note 55.
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Eighteenth Amendment ended this controversy, but it was rekin-
dled after passage of the Twenty-first Amendment.'87 The Court
concluded that although it has traditionally treated the Amend-
ment as an exception to normal Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
"the Twenty-first Amendment does not pro tanto repeal the Com-
merce Clause, but merely requires that each provision 'be consid-
ered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and
interests at stake in any concrete case." 88
In this line of cases, Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias is a quintes-
sential case upon which the current United States Supreme Court
is likely to rely upon heavily in rendering its decision regarding
the constitutionality of the regulation of direct nationwide wine
delivery.."' In Bacchus, Hawaii charged a twenty percent excise
tax on all alcoholic beverages except locally produced okolehao and
pineapple wine.9 Out-of-state importers challenged this law un-
der the Commerce Clause.'' The Court noted that the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, in a previous ruling, upheld a challenge to this
act based in part upon violations of the Equal Protection Clause
and the Commerce Clause.'92
The liquor tax at issue, enacted in 1939 to assist Hawaii in de-
fraying the costs of governmental services, originally did not con-
tain any exemptions.9 In 1971, seeking to encourage develop-
ment of the Hawaiian liquor industry, the legislature established
exemptions for okolehao and pineapple wine.194 Bacchus Imports
and Eagle Distributors were liquor wholesalers that sold to li-
censed retailers in Hawaii.' The wholesalers initiated protest
proceedings in Hawaii's Tax Appeal Court and sought refunds of
all taxes.9 The wholesalers argued that the tax violated the
Commerce Clause and requested a refund of over $45 million paid
in taxes under the statute.97 The Tax Appeal Court rejected the
187. Craig, 429 U.S. at 205.
188. Id. (quoting Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332).
189. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
190. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 265. "Okolehao is a brandy distilled from the
root of the ti plant, an indigenous shrub of Hawaii." Id. Other locally produced liquors
were not exempted from the tax. Id. The Hawaii Liquor Tax was codified at HAW. REV.
STAT. § 244-4 (Supp. 1983).
191. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 266.
192. Id. (citing In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P. 2d 724, 735 (Haw. 1982).
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Commerce Clause argument and held that "the exemption was
rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in promoting
domestic industry. .. ."' The Tax Appeal Court also held that the
tax did not illegally discriminate against interstate commerce be-
cause it applied to wholesalers located within Hawaii.9 The Ha-
waii Supreme Court upheld this ruling, and the wholesalers ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. °0
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting "[a] cardinal
rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that '[no] State, consis-
tent with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which dis-
criminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business.' 20 ' Hawaii argued that
the okolehao and pineapple wines were such a small part of liquor
sales within its borders that the distillers of these liquors gained
no advantage by not paying the tax. °2 In response to this argu-
ment, the Court opined:
[N] either the small volume of sales of exempted liquor nor the
fact that the exempted liquors do not constitute a present
'competitive threat' to other liquors is dispositive of the ques-
tion whether competition exists between the locally produced
beverages and foreign beverages; instead, they go only to the
extent of such competition. It is well settled that '[we] need
not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates.""
The Court went on to note that Hawaii's argument that there
was no competitive advantage was undermined by the underlying
reason for the tax, to promote sales of the locally produced bever-
ages. 204 Hawaii argued that the tax credibly advanced legitimate
state objectives, that there was no patent discrimination against
interstate trade, and that the effect on interstate commerce was
incidental.20' The Court applied the traditional Commerce Clause
198. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 266 (citing In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P.2d
at 730).
199. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 266 (citing In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P.2d
at 734).
200. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 267.
201. Id. at 268 (citing Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329
(1977)).
202. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 268.
203. Id. at 269 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981)).
204. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 268.
205. Id. at 270.
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analysis and asserted that state legislation constitutes "economic
protectionism" if it is discriminatory in intent or in effect."°6 The
Court concluded that since Hawaii admitted that the statute was
designed to promote local industry, there was no need to guess at
the tax's purpose."' The Court also determined that because there
was competition between the local, exempt products and nonex-
empt products from outside Hawaii, the tax had a discriminatory
effect.0 ' The Court added that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes
of the [commerce] Clause 'was to insure ... against discriminating
State legislation."'0 ° Furthermore, the Majority noted:
[a] discriminating tax imposed by a State operating to the
disadvantage of the products of other States when introduced
into the first mentioned State, is, in effect, a regulation in re-
straint of commerce among the States, and as such is a usur-
pation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the
Congress of the United States.210
Thus, the Court held "the Commerce Clause limits the manner
in which States may legitimately compete for interstate trade, for
'in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax
the products manufactured or the business operations performed
in any other State." 21' Finally, the Court found it was "therefore
apparent that the Hawaii Supreme Court erred in concluding that
there was no improper discrimination against interstate commerce
merely because the burden of the tax was borne by consumers in
Hawaii. -p12
Alternatively, Hawaii argued that it had the power to imple-
ment this taxation scheme under the Twenty-first Amendment.213
The Majority asserted that despite broad language in some of the
opinions of the Supreme Court written shortly after ratification of
the Twenty-first Amendment, the grant of authority given to
206. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-353
(1977) (discriminatory intent) and Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(discriminatory effect)).
207. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 271.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1876)).
210. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 271 (citing Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446,
455 (1886)).
211. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 272 (citing Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. at 337).
212. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 272.
213. Id. at 274.
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states in those early cases was not as clearly given in section two
of the Amendment as it was thought to have been at one time.214
It was clear to the Court that "the [Twenty-first] Amendment did
not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from
the ambit of the Commerce Clause."215 According to the Majority,
the ultimate question to be decided in this case was "whether the
principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment [were] suffi-
ciently implicated by the exemption for okolehao and pineapple
wine to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would oth-
erwise be offended."2 16 The Court was convinced that Hawaii's dis-
criminatory tax could not stand because the central purpose of the
Twenty-first Amendment was not to empower states to favor local
liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition.217 Since Ha-
waii "[did] not seek to justify its tax on the ground that it was de-
signed to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of
the Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the
purpose was 'to promote a local industry,'" the Court struck down
the tax.
218
The dissent argued that the tax should stand because "the
wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim [was] squarely foreclosed by
the Twenty-first Amendment. ,,219 Since the tax applied to the
sale of liquor in the local market in Hawaii, Justice Stevens rea-
soned, it fell within the protection of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.2 ° The dissent relied primarily on cases such as Ziffrin, In-
dianapolis Brewing Co., Hueblein, Inc., Hostetter and Craig to find
that the Amendment removed cases involving alcohol from Com-
merce Clause analysis.
221
In decisions just prior to Swedenburg and Heald, the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits struck down laws that prohibited direct ship-
ments in North Carolina and Texas as violative of the Commerce
Clause.222 In doing so, both of these cases relied heavily upon the
Supreme Court's analysis in Bacchus Imports v. Dias.222
214. Id.
215. Id. at 275.
216. Id.
217. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor join.
220. Id. at 280.
221. Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 282.
222. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388
(5th Cir, 2003).
223. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514; Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 395-97.
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In Beskind v. Easley, the Fourth Circuit found that North Caro-
lina's prohibition against direct shipments favored in-state winer-
ies, thereby violating the Commerce Clause.2 4 The Fourth Circuit
did not accept North Carolina's argument that the prohibition fell
under the "core concerns" exception carved out of the Twenty-first
Amendment.225
In Dickerson v Bailey, the Fifth Circuit struck down a Texas law
prohibiting direct shipments to consumers by out-of-state wineries
because the same prohibition did not apply to Texas wineries.2 6
The court held that under controlling Supreme Court precedent, it
first had to determine whether the law violated the Commerce
Clause, and, if so, whether it was "saved" by the "core concerns"
argument under the Twenty-first Amendment.227 The court de-
termined that the law violated the Commerce Clause and was not
saved by the Twenty-first Amendment, despite Texas' arguments
that the law was enacted for the protection and safety of the peo-
ple of the state.228
If Bacchus Imports, Ltd. is in fact the controlling Supreme
Court precedent, as suggested by Beskind, then Beskind,
Dickerson and Heald will serve as the roadmap to guide the Su-
preme Court as it strikes down laws prohibiting direct shipments
of wine to consumers. Opponents would argue that the Court
should follow the analysis in Swedenburg and Bridenbaugh, cases
in which the Second and Seventh Circuits exempted laws regulat-
ing alcohol from traditional Commerce Clause doctrine.229
VIII. CONCLUSION
The current prohibition on direct shipment of out-of-state wines
leaves wine consumers with limited choices. 20  Additionally, the
system hurts small wineries by limiting their ability to ship to
consumers who reside in numerous jurisdictions.23' Although the
number of wineries and available wines has grown dramatically in
224. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514.
225. Id.
226. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 394-95.
227. Id. at 395
228. Id. at 395-97.
229. Swedenburg, 356 F.3d at 231; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d 848.
230. Mark Brnovich, Trading Grapes: The Case for Direct Wine Shipments in Arizona,
Goldwater Institute Policy Report, Number 184, November 2003, 2, available at
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.orgpdf/materials//369.pdf (last visited November 28, 2004).
231. Id.
142 Vol. 43
Interstate Shipment of Wine
the United States over the past 30 years, wine wholesalers, who
benefit most from the current system, continue to dictate the
availability of out-of-state wines to many American wine consum-
ers. 232 Consumers and trade groups argue that reasonable meas-
ures can be added to state statutes to address the Twenty-first
Amendment's core concerns and to ensure that alcoholic beverages
are not delivered to minors."' Requiring a purchaser of wine to
provide a driver's license number and credit card at the time of
purchase in conjunction with requiring shipping agents to obtain
proof upon delivery that the recipient is at least twenty-one years
of age constitute reasonable measures that allow states to police
wine purchases from out-of-state wineries.234
In addition, if a state can collect taxes on clothing and furniture
shipped from out of state, it directly follows that it can collect
taxes on alcohol shipped from out-of-state.235 Moreover, with the
current state of the economy, states must be constantly on the
lookout for new ways to raise revenue.236 Taxes from out-of-state
wine sales provide the perfect opportunity.237 States that currently
allow in-state shipments of wine, but ban out-of-state shipments,
should in particular consider rewriting their alcoholic beverage
control laws and allow some form of shipment from out-of-state
wineries. If the United States Supreme Court invalidates laws
banning direct shipments, its remedy may be in the form of allow-
ing direct shipments nationwide; however, it may also be in the
form of enjoining in-state direct shipment of wine, thereby hurting
the nation's wineries even more than the current system.
239 Allow-
ing for direct shipments of wine nationwide will allow wine to join
other agricultural products which are shipped nationwide, such as
potatoes from Idaho, steaks from Nebraska and hams from Vir-
ginia.24° "Adults should be able to buy a legal agricultural product
directly from the grower, and it should matter not whether it's an
232. Id.
233. Id. at 8.
234. Id.
235. Brnovich, supra note 227 at 8-9.
236. Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-




240. Froma Harrop, Stop the Prohibitionist Bickering, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL,
June 6, 2004 at 1-9.
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orange from Florida or Pinot Noir from Oregon. To say that they
cannot defies both the [C]ommerce [Cilause and common sense."
241
Gerald B. McNamara
241. Id.
